



Originalism, J.E.M.,1 and the Food Supply, or 
Will the Real Decision Maker Please Stand Up? 
 
In 2001, the United States Supreme Court decided J.E.M. AG 
Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. (J.E.M.), holding that 
sexually reproduced plants are statutorily proper subject matter for 
full utility patents.2  In the long shadow of J.E.M., many of the 
speakers at the “Malthus, Mendel and Monsanto” conference3 
explained (some with great anger) that the world’s food supply is at 
risk—not from Martians, but from the patent system—as manipulated 
by Monsanto and a few other giant agribusinesses.  Utility patents on 
basic food crops4 have been used to close down experimental farms.5  
Patented genetically engineered DNA has contaminated wild 
varieties.6  When nature produces an insect or crop disease which 
∗ Visiting Associate Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, 2003-04; Visiting 
Associate Professor, University of Idaho School of Law, 2004-05.  My thanks for 
generous comments on earlier drafts from the participants and audience at the “Malthus, 
Mendel and Monsanto” conference, Keith Aoki, Louis Altman, Ignacio Chapela, Gene 
Quinn, and Edward C. Walterscheid.  All errors are solely the responsibility of the author. 
1 J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001).   
2 Id. at 145. 
3 Held by the Wayne Morse Center for Law and Politics at the University of Oregon 
School of Law, April 16, 2004 [hereinafter “MMM Conference”]. 
4 A rule against patenting “plants,” “seeds,” or other listed subject matter might prove 
impractical to enforce due to the ability of patent attorneys and patent agents to draft 
claims to bypass such limits.  See Mark D. Janis, Sustainable Agriculture, Patent Rights, 
and Plant Innovation, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 91, 96-103 (2001) (discussing this 
problem and illustrating it with decisions of the European Patent Office).  The flexibility 
of patent drafting helped defeat the unpatentability of computer programs in the United 
States.  Compare Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972) (holding that the 
formula for converting format of numbers is not patentable subject matter) with In re 
Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (holding as patentable claims to 
software which were drawn in relationship to a general purpose computer); accord Janis, 
supra at 101-02 (comparing gradual U.S. acceptance of patentability of computer software 
with current European Union issues regarding theoretical unpatentability of plant 
varieties).  Additionally, if a country allows patents on modified genes but not on plants or 
plant parts, what happens when someone plants a seed containing the modified gene?  The 
Supreme Court of Canada recently held that the planter infringes the patent on the gene.  
See Schmeiser v. Monsanto Canada, Inc., [2004] S.C.R. 34, 58-59. 
5 See Steven Jones, Remarks in Panel on “The Production of Agricultural Knowledge 
and Access to Seed Germplasm,” MMM Conference, supra note 3. 
6 See Steven Brush, Remarks in Panel on “Global Food Supply Concentration, 
Erosion, Traditional Knowledge, and Crisis,” MMM Conference, supra note 3; see also  
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flourishes on Monsanto’s Round-Up®,7 we will have insufficient 
alternatives.8  This paper does not elaborate on these risks.  Instead, it 
discusses the disheartening history of how we got here, so that we can 
take precautions against additional trips in this direction. 
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, this paper explains 
that many utility patents on plants, and perhaps most utility patents on 
biotechnology, are legally suspect for violation of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 
paragraph 1 (section 112(1)), by allowing deposit to substitute for the 
statutorily-mandated enabling written description.  The section 112(1) 
problem is especially intriguing because Justice Thomas’ majority 
opinion in J.E.M. relied on the alleged modern ability of plant 
breeders to provide written descriptions sufficient for section 112(1) 
compliance.  According to Thomas, earlier statements in 
congressional reports that plants were not proper subject matter for 
utility patents rested on the inconceivability of writing enabling 
descriptions.9  According to the Court (while invisible to Congress, 
patent attorneys, the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), and the 
general public), plants of all kinds seemingly had been included in 
section 101 of the 1790 or 1793 Patent Act.10  These utility patents 
did not issue until the 1980s because, only then, did science provide 
MARGARET MELLON & JANE RISSLER, GONE TO SEED:  TRANSGENIC CONTAMINANTS IN 
THE TRADITIONAL SEED SUPPLY (Union of Concerned Scientists 2004), available at 
http://www.ucsusa.org/documents/ seedreport_fullreport.pdf.
7 “Super weeds” resistant to Round-Up®, which require use of herbicides similar to 
Agent Orange, have already invaded the great plains of Canada and the United States.  See 
Percy Schmeiser, Remarks on “David v. Goliath:  Foreign Enforcement of U.S. Patent 
Law and the Might of Monsanto,” MMM Conference, supra note 3. 
8 Stock piles of diversity to cope with future possible crises are dwindling in both plant 
and animal populations.  Only three major breeding flocks of food turkeys exist, and their 
DNA is almost identical.   Five firms (two of which share a joint venture) control the 
global seed industry.  See William Hoffman, Remarks in Panel on “The Global Food 
Supply:  Concentration, Erosion, Traditional Knowledge, and Crisis,” MMM Conference, 
supra note 3. 
9 J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 134 (2001).  “[I]n 
1930 Congress believed that plants were not patentable under § 101 . . . because in practice 
they could not meet the stringent description requirement.  Yet th[is] premise[] w[as] 
disproved over time.”  Id. (emphasis in original).  Referring to PPA legislative history, 
Justice Thomas opined that “[w]hatever Congress may have believed about the state of 
patent law and the science of plant breeding in 1930, plants have always had the potential 
to fall within the general subject matter of § 101 . . . .”  Id. at 135 (emphasis in original).  
Justice Thomas then reasoned with regard to the PVPA that “[t]he relevant statements in 
the legislative history reveal nothing more than the limited view of plant breeding taken by 
some Members of Congress who believed that patent protection was unavailable for 
sexually reproduced plants.”  Id. at 41. 
10 See J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 135.  The Court also rejected Petitioner’s argument that “the 
PVPA altered the subject-matter coverage of § 101 by implication.”  Id. at 141-42. 
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language sufficient to craft enabling written descriptions of such 
inventions. Oddly, only one year after J.E.M., the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) held in Enzo 
Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc. that both the enablement and written 
description requirements of section 112(1) could be fulfilled through 
deposit11—without admitting that it was undercutting one of J.E.M.’s 
main props for constructing the fiction that Congress had legislated 
utility patents on plants.  Thus, without any congressional action, the 
courts and the PTO have given a few large businesses the power to 
close down most independent research on basic food crops.12  Raising 
the J.E.M.-Enzo II disconnect might prod the courts into more 
constraining deference to Congress. 
As the Drafters of the Constitution warned the ratifying generation, 
the machine of representative government requires the lubrication of 
public accountability.13  Ex ante, the public must know who will 
make a decision so that they may attempt to influence the outcome.  
Ex post, the public must know who made the decision, so that the 
public may assign praise or blame by words and ballots.  The most 
frightening aspect of the current patent power of agribusiness is the 
lack of such a decision maker.  No publicly accountable U.S. 
official(s) decided that utility patents on sexually reproduced plants 
were good policy.  Such refusal to accept responsibility is not a 
necessary part of the rule of law in a republican polity, even when the 
legislature leaves large statutory gaps for judicial explication.  Canada 
chose not to take this course.14
What happened in the United States?  Everyone involved made 
believe that the decision had already been made by someone else—
even though everyone knew to the contrary.  No one, therefore, took 
responsibility for choosing a major change in public policy. 
11 Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
12 See id., discussed infra text accompanying notes 131-51. 
13 “But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive, and which lies 
as much against the last as the first plan, is, that it tends to conceal faults and destroy 
responsibility.  Responsibility is of two kinds to censure and to punishment.”  THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 70, 4 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing in favor of a unitary executive), 
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fedpapers.html (last visited Sept. 15, 
2004). 
14 See Harvard Coll. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] S.C.R. 45 (refusing 
to order Commissioner of Patents to grant patent on the oncomouse, “[t]he patentability of 
higher life forms is a highly contentious matter raising serious practical, ethical and 
environmental concerns not contemplated by the [Canadian Patent] Act . . . .  If a special 
legislative scheme was needed to protect plant varieties, a subset of higher life forms, a 
similar scheme may also be required to deal with patenting higher life forms in general.”). 
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This paper traces the line of non-decision.15  Part One traces the 
non-decision to grant full utility patent protection to basic food crops.  
Part Two traces the non-decision to grant such patents without the 
enabling written description required by statute for all utility patents. 
I 
THE DECISION TO GRANT UTILITY PATENTS 
A.  The Constitution 
First, someone decided to include in the Constitution a 
congressional power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries[,]”16 the 
Progress Clause, a.k.a. the Copyright and Patent Clause (the 
“Clause”)17  While James Madison and William Pinkney both made 
related proposals, neither suggested the exact words included in the 
Constitution.18  The current text emerged from the Committee of 
Eleven and was accepted by the drafting convention with no one 
dissenting; any related discussion has been lost from the historical 
record.19  During the ratification debates, the Clause was almost 
unmentioned.20
15 The fact of “non-decision” has been noticed by many others.  Bagley describes the 
United State’s system as “patent first, ask questions later,” and points out that Congress’ 
inaction is a de facto delegation of power over patentable subject matter to inventors’ 
patent attorneys and patent agents.  See Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions 
Later:  Morality and Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469, 474-78 
(2003).  Nor is patent the only area of law in which Congress routinely ducks decision 
making.  See, e.g., Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Penalty Default Canon, 72 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 663 (2004) (arguing that, when a statutory hole constitutes an 
attempt by Congress to shift decision-making responsibility, courts should void the 
relevant statute as an unconstitutional delegation of power); Mark Seidenfeld, Pyrrhic 
Political Penalties:  Why the Public Would Lose Under the ‘Penalty Default Canon’, 72 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 724 (2004) (agreeing that Congress ducks decision-making, but 
arguing that the penalty suggested by Baker and Krawiec would be counter-productive); 
see also Baker & Krawiec, supra, at 6-7, 73-86 (listing other theories on construction of 
incomplete statutes). 
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
17 See Malla Pollack, What is Congress Supposed to Promote?  Defining “Progress” in 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or Introducing the 
Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 755 n.1 (2001) (discussing Clause’s various titles). 
18 JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 
477-79 (1966) (listing suggestions for congressional powers). 
19 See, e.g., Malla Pollack, Purveyance and Power, or Over-Priced Free Lunch:  The 
Intellectual Property Clause as an Ally of the Takings Clause in the Public’s Control of  
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Nothing in the surviving materials demonstrates that the Drafters or 
Ratifiers believed that every non-obvious advance21 should be 
patentable.  On the contrary, the purpose limitation in the Clause 
would be unnecessary if all conceivable “exclusive right[s]” granted 
for “limited times” to “inventors” in their “discoveries” would 
necessarily “promote the progress of . . . useful arts.”22  The Supreme 
Court has implied its recognition of some limiting principle by 
refusing to allow patents on scientific principles (such as E=mc2), 
mathematical principles (such as the Pythagorean Theorem), and 
abstract intellectual processes (such as methods of making 
calculations) on the sole ground that the opposite rule would deprive 
the public of “basic tools of scientific and technological work.”23
However, Congress does seem to have the discretionary power to 
enact exclusive rights in non-obvious advances in plant breeding.  
Government, 30 SW. U. L. REV. 1, 99-106 (2000) (reviewing available information about 
the drafting convention’s handling of the clause). 
20 See id. at 106-116 (discussing ratification); see also EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, TO 
PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS:  AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND 
ADMINISTRATION, 1787-1836, at 55-59 (1998) (discussing scantiness of ratification 
material); Malla Pollack, The Multiple Unconstitutionality of Business Method Patents:  
Common Sense, Congressional Consideration, and Constitutional History, 28 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 61, 81-120 (2002) [hereinafter Multiple Unconstitutionality] 
(discussing ratification record and concluding that it supports the exclusion of business 
methods from patentable subject matter). 
21 For the purposes of this paper, I accept the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the 
“discoveries” of “inventors” are limited to those advances which are not obvious to a 
person of ordinary skill in the relevant art. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 
(1966) (holding that these constitutional words require that patents be granted only to 
advances which would not be obvious to persons of ordinary skill in the relevant art).  But 
see Edward C. Walterscheid, The Hotchkiss Unobviousness Standard:  Early Judicial 
Activism in the Patent Law, (forthcoming), (draft copy on file with author) (concluding 
that the non-obviousness standard for a patentable invention is required by the 
constitutional phrase "promote the progress of . . . useful arts," but reading Graham as not 
recognizing the standard's constitutional basis).  As discussed at length elsewhere, my 
empirical research demonstrates that the 1789 American meaning of “progress” was 
“physical movement,” so that “promote the progress of science and useful arts” means 
“promote the distribution of knowledge and new technology throughout the population.”  
See Pollack, supra note 17, passim (explaining data supporting this conclusion). 
22 The Supreme Court declined to enforce the Clause’s purpose limitation in Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).  However, the Court expressly pointed out the petitioners’ 
decision not to argue that the purpose limitation had independent power.  See id. at 211 
(“[P]etitioners do not argue that the Clause’s preamble is an independently enforceable 
limit on Congress’ power.”).  I read Eldred’s holding as limited to approving Congress’ 
power to grant retrospective extensions of copyright and patent terms.  See id. at 218 (“For 
the several reasons stated, we find no Copyright Clause impediment to the CTEA’s 
extension of existing copyrights.”). 
23 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); accord Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 
175, 185 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589-90 (1978). 
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While I, and other scholars, have argued that the original meaning of 
the Patent Clause excludes monopolies on business methods,24 those 
arguments turn on the original meaning of the phrase “useful arts.”  I 
am not prepared to claim that, in 1789, farming was not considered a 
“useful art.”25  Early British and American patents protected farm 
machinery and processes.  For example, the legislature of colonial 
Pennsylvania granted a 1717 petition to record an English patent on a 
novel method for refining Indian corn before shipment.26  Colonial 
Maryland granted two patents for threshing machines.27  Colonial 
South Carolina issued several patents for rice processing machinery 
and one for “certain implements for the better preparing and 
cultivating of rice, indico [sic] and grain, planted in rows.”28  In 
Restoration Britain, a few patents were issued on newly-industrialized 
crops, though the patentees seemingly made no attempts to enforce 
their rights against others.  Three early eighteenth century British 
patents involved fertilizers and another covered swine feed.29  At this 
time, of course, the British government had a registration system; 
patent applications were granted without any inquiry into their 
merit.30  These patents, therefore, may well have been invalid.  
Nevertheless, I cannot make a good argument that plant breeding is 
not a “useful art” pursuant to Article I, section 8, clause 8. 
24 See, e.g., John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 
1139, 1169-75 (1999); Multiple Unconstitutionality, supra note 20, at 86-91.  But see State 
St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(laying “to rest” the “ill-conceived” business method exception to patentable subject 
matter). 
25 One of the unincluded suggestions made to the Drafting Convention expressly 
supported agriculture, a congressional power “[t]o establish public institutions, rewards 
and immunities for the promotion of agriculture, commerce, trades, and manufactures.”  II 
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 181-82  (Max Farrand ed., 
1937). 
26 See BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 72 
(1967) (quoting patent as protecting “Cleansing, curing & Refining of Indian Corn 
Growing in the Plantations, fitter [sic] for Shipping & Transportation, in a manner not 
before found out and Practised.”). 
27 See id. at 73-74 (asserting that colonial Maryland issued only two known patents, an 
Oct. 18, 1770 grant to John Clayton for a threshing machine and a Nov. 2, 1770 grant to 
Isaac Perkins for another threshing machine). 
28 See id. at 76-82.  One of the petitions sent to Congress by inventors (before a patent 
statute was enacted) involved farm machinery.  See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 20, at 107 
(listing petition by Leonard Harbaugh for rights over “machines which he has invented for 
threshing, reaping . . . .”). 
29 See CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION:  THE 
ENGLISH PATENT SYSTEM, 1660-1800, at 98 n.4 (1988). 
30 See id. at 2 n.4 (British had registration system until late nineteenth century). 
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One might try to argue that plants are not the “discoveries” of 
“inventors.”  The Divinity or the big bang created them.  
Unfortunately, that argument would undercut all patentable subject 
matter.  The Supreme Court was right, I believe, when it said the line 
between “products of nature” and “patentable inventions” regards the 
extent of human intervention involved in the process of change, not 
the line between living and non-living.31  But recognizing that some 
living things may be patentable does not answer the question of 
whether Congress decided to make full utility patents available on 
basic food crops. 
In sum, the Patent Clause of the Constitution seems to allow 
Congress to enact a patent statute providing full utility patents for 
non-obvious sexually reproduced plants.  What I cannot locate is a 
determination by Congress to enact such a statute. 
B.  The Statutes 
The next decision point is Congress’ passage of the Patent Act of 
1790, which is described in detail by historian Edward C. 
Walterscheid.32  He points to no discussions about plants, animals, or 
farm products.33  This statute cabins patentable subject matter as “any 
useful Art, Manufacture, Engine, Machine, or Device, or any 
improvement therein.”34  In 1793, Congress passed a new Patent Act 
31 “Congress . . . recognized[,] the . . . distinction was not between living and inanimate 
things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made 
inventions.”  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 313 (1980) (discussing congressional 
reports accompanying the PPA). 
32 See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 20, at 109-143. 
33 The first suggested bill covered both patents and copyrights, H.R. 10, 1st Cong. 
(1789), reprinted in WALTERSHEID, supra note 20, at 433. Patentable subject matter was 
defined as “any new art, manufacture, engine, machine, invention or device, or any 
improvement upon, or in some art, manufacture, engine, machine, invention or device.”  
H.R. 10 § 3, reprinted in WALTERSCHEID, supra note 20, at 435.  Congress then turned to 
separate acts respectively for copyrights and patents.  Under the first separate Patent Bill, 
H.R. 41, 1st Cong. (1790), patentable subject matter included “any new art, manufacture, 
engine, machine, invention or device, or any improvement upon, or in some art, 
manufacture, engine, machine, invention or device.”  H.R. 41, 1st Cong. § 1 (1790), 
reprinted in WALTERSCHEID, supra note 20, at 445.  In the March 10, 1790 version of 
H.R. 41, patentable subject matter is edited to read, “any useful art, manufacture, engine, 
machine, or device; or any improvement upon, or in some art, manufacture, engine, 
machine, invention or device.”  H.R. 41, 1st Cong. § 1 (1790), reprinted in 
WALTERSCHEID, supra note 20, at 455. 
34 Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109, ch. 7, § 1 (1790), reprinted in WALTERSCHEID, supra 
note 20, at 463.  An amendment was suggested in February 1791 which probably read 
“any new and useful art, machine, or composition of matter.”  Walterscheid could not 
locate an official version of H.R. 121, 1st Cong. (1791), but suggests this language is  
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which set patentable subject matter at “any new and useful art, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter.”35  Patentable subject matter remained stable36 
until the 1952 revision, wherein it morphed into its current form, “any 
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”37  According to 
the accompanying congressional report, “process” was the judicially 
established  meaning of the statutory word it replaced, “art.”38 
If plants are patentable subject matter, they are either 
“manufactures,” or “compositions of matter”—enacted terms going 
back respectively to the Patent Acts of 1790 and 1793.  Were plants 
within the contemplation of law makers during consideration of the 
1790 or 1793 Acts?  No one can be sure, but the premier historian of 
this material, Edward C. Walterscheid, makes no mention of any such 
link.39  As Walterscheid mentions, Alexander Hamilton’s Report on 
the Subject of Manufactures,40 submitted to the House of 
Representatives on December 5, 1791, recognized that some people 
read the Patent Clause to disallow patents for importation of 
technology.41  As an alternative, Hamilton suggested a system of 
pecuniary rewards to support “arts, agriculture, manufactures, and 
commerce,” including importations of technology and trained 
located in Thomas Jefferson’s papers.  See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 20, at 469.  The 
next suggested iteration of patentable subject matter is H.R. 166, 2nd Cong. (1792) which 
included “any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any 
new and useful improvement.”  H.R. 166, 2nd Cong. (1792), reprinted in WALTERSCHEID, 
supra note 20, at 493. 
35 1 Stat. 318 § 1 (1793), reprinted in WALTERSCHEID, supra note 20, at 479. 
36 The Patent Act of 1836, 5 Stat. 117 § 6, retained the earlier limits on patentable 
subject matter, “any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, 
or any new and useful improvement [of the same].”  Reprinted in WALTERSCHEID, supra 
note 20, at 497, 499. 
37 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2004). 
38 S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2398-99. 
39 See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 20, at 23-24.  In e-mail correspondence, 
Walterscheid advised me that his concentrated study of the historical record had unearthed 
no evidence that the Drafters, the ratifying generation, or the members of early sessions of 
Congress believed that plants, or other living matter, were patentable subject matter.  E-
mail from Edward C. Walterscheid, to Malla Pollack, Visiting Professor, Univ. of Ore. 
School of Law (May 1, 2004) (on file with author). 
40 See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, REPORT ON THE SUBJECT OF MANUFACTURES (1791), 
reprinted in 4 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON IN TWELVE VOLUMES, at 70-198 
(Henry Cabot Lodge ed., Fed. Ed. 1904). 
41 See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 20, at 148-49 (discussing HAMILTON, supra note 40, 
at 156). 
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workers.42  The inclusion of “agriculture” in the premium system is 
ambiguous, at best, on Hamilton’s views concerning the overlap of 
plant breeding and utility patents.  Furthermore, the Report on the 
Subject of Manufactures predates the inclusion of “composition of 
matter” in the statutory list of patentable subject matter.43  A sentence 
in the report accompanying the 1836 reorganization of the patent 
system is similarly ambiguous.  The report, discussing the United 
States before the War of 1812, states that “[t]he arts in this country 
were but little understood, and but little cultivated.  Agriculture and 
commerce constituted our principle business.”44
Early federal legislators were aware of scientific farming.  Even in 
the slave states, public interest in improvement in American 
agricultural practice was widespread in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries.45  Many leading politicians, including both 
George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, were actively involved in 
agricultural innovation on their own land.46  Americans understood 
the desirability of better seed stocks.  One American reaction to a 
1790s epidemic of Hessian fly was a search for more resistant wheat 
varieties.47
In the twentieth century, plant breeders were given some protection 
by two statutory schemes distinct from utility patents, the Plant Patent 
Act of 1930 (PPA)48 and the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1976 
42 See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 20, at 149 (discussing HAMILTON, supra note 40, at 
195-97). 
43 One early patent holder, the hero (or villain) of several early patent cases did want 
patentable subject matter to include plants, but he was never empowered to enact statutes. 
The discovery of an unknown plant and its uses.  Here the plant will be secured, 
and all the uses that are specified by the patentee . . . .  The discovery of new uses 
of a known plant.  Here the new uses will be secured, subject to the prior right of 
the discoverer of the plant, during the patent term. 
WALTERSCHEID, supra note 20, at 317 (quoting OLIVER EVANS WRITING AS P.N.I. 
ELISHA, PATENT RIGHT OPPRESSION EXPOSED; OR, KNAVERY DETECTED (1813)). 
44 See 1836 Senate Committee Report, reprinted in 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 853, 859 
(1936), available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/jpatos/ 
B&size=2&rot=0&collection=journals&id=1133. 
45 See A. Glenn Crothers, Agricultural Improvement and Technological Innovation in a 
Slave Society:  The Case of Early National Northern Virginia, 75 AGRIC. HIST. 135, 135 
(2001). 
46 See id. at 140, 142, 148, 158, 160 (mentioning specific innovations tried by Jefferson 
and Washington). 
47 See id. at 145-46, 151 (mentioning suggested varieties). 
48 See Act of May 23, 1930, 46 Stat. 376 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 
(1954)).  Several earlier, but unenacted, bills would have provided utility patent protection 
for some types of plants.  See Mark D. Janis & Jay P. Kesan, U.S. Plant Variety  
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(PVPA).49  Neither required the detailed enabling description needed 
to obtain a utility patent.50  Neither gave right holders the exclusion 
power of utility patents.  Reproducing a plant by seed (i.e., sexually) 
is not (and never was) a violation of a plant patent.51  PVPA rights 
have two major exceptions—one allowing farmers to save seed for 
later planting52 and one allowing research.53
Neither the Court nor the PTO has suggested that Congress 
considered and decided to grant full utility patent protection to 
sexually reproduced plants, which include the United States’ major 
food crops.  On the contrary, the Congresspersons involved in passing 
the PPA and PVPA clearly indicated their belief that utility patents, 
section 101 patentable subject matter, did not include these food 
crops.  Both the House and Senate reports concerning the PPA 
asserted that: 
Protection:  Sound and Fury. . . ?, 39 HOUSTON L. REV. 727, 733-37 (2002) (mentioning 
five such bills between 1892 and 1930).  Another such bill was considered in the 1960s.  
See id. at 737-39. 
49 Pub. L. No. 91-577 (1970) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (1994)). 
50  Compare 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶1 (2000), for utility patents: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the 
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it 
is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best 
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention; 
with 35 U.S.C. § 162 (2000), for plant patents:  “No plant patent shall be declared invalid 
for noncompliance with section 112 of this title if the description is as complete as is 
reasonably possible”; with 7 U.S.C. § 2422(2) (2000), referring to the PVPA: 
A description of the variety setting forth its distinctiveness, uniformity, and stability 
and a description of the genealogy and breeding procedure, when known.  The 
Secretary [of Agriculture] may require amplification, including the submission of 
adequate photographs or drawings or plant specimens, if the description is not 
adequate or as complete as reasonably possible. . . . 
51 See 35 U.S.C. § 163 (providing “the right to exclude others from asexually 
reproducing the plant. . . .”) (emphasis added); see also J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer 
Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 151 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (recognizing that PPA 
does not give “an exclusive right to reproduce the plant sexually, i.e., the right to 
reproduce it through seeds.”). 
52 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (2000). 
53 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (2000) (“The use and reproduction of a protected variety for plant 
breeding or other bona fide research shall not constitute an infringement of the protection 
provided under this chapter.”); see also 7 U.S.C. § 2541(e) (2000) (“It shall not be an 
infringement of the rights of the owner of a variety to perform any act done privately and 
for noncommercial purposes.”).  Accord J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 129 n.1 (“Most notably, the 
PVPA provides exemptions for research and for farmers to save seed from their crops for 
replanting.”). 
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[t]he purpose of the bill is to afford agriculture, so far as practicable, 
the same opportunity to participate in the benefits of the patent 
system as has been given industry, and thus assist in placing 
agriculture on a basis of economic equality with industry. . . .  
Today the plant breeder has no adequate financial incentive to enter 
upon his work.  A new variety once it has left the hands of the 
breeder may be reproduced in unlimited quantity by all. . . . 54
The report accompanying the PVPA stated that the new protection 
was necessary because “[u]nder patent law, protection is presently 
limited to those varieties of plants which reproduce asexually.”55
Yet the United States Supreme Court insists that Congress created 
full utility patent protection for sexually reproduced plants, including 
basic food crops.56  How?  By the lawyerly trick of conflating 
constructive intent (the words of a statute) with actual intent (thinking 
through a problem).57  According to the Court (while invisible to 
Congress, patent attorneys, the PTO,  and the general public), plants 
of all kinds seemingly had been included in section 101 from the 1790 
or 1793 Patent Act.  These utility patents did not issue until the 1980s 
because, only then, did science provide language sufficient to craft 
enabling written descriptions of such inventions.58
C.  The Courts 
So how did the United States Supreme Court conclude that “any . . 
. manufacture . . . or composition of matter” includes sexually 
reproduced food crops?  First, the language was read broadly because 
54 H.R. Rep. No. 71-1129 (1930); S. Rep. No. 71-315 (1930). 
55 H.R. Rep. No. 91-1605 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5082-83. 
56 See J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 138 (2001). 
57 Someone who believes that law is merely politics with different rhetoric might see a 
strong tie between the outcome and the opinion’s authorship by Justice Thomas, who 
worked for Monsanto from 1977-79, according to the biography posted on the Supreme 
Court’s own website.  See THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT 2, at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2004). 
58 See J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 134 (“[I]n 1930 Congress believed that plants were not 
patentable under § 101 . . . because in practice they could not meet the stringent 
description requirement.  Yet th[is] premise[] w[as] disproved over time.”) (emphasis in 
original); id. at 135 (referring to PPA legislative history, “[w]hatever Congress may have 
believed about the state of patent law and the science of plant breeding in 1930, plants 
have always had the potential to fall within the general subject matter of § 101. . . . ”) 
(emphasis in original); id. at 141 (referring to PVPA “[t]he relevant statements in the 
legislative history reveal nothing more than the limited view of plant breeding taken by 
some Members of Congress who believed that patent protection was unavailable for 
sexually reproduced plants.”) 
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the language was perceived as being broadly worded.59  This is 
troubling because the Court began with the standard axiom that 
“unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their 
ordinary, contemporary common meaning.”60  The Court, however, 
did not recite any 1790, 1793, or 1952 use of “manufacture” or 
“composition of matter” which, even allegedly, included food crops.61
To check for the contemporary understanding of the terms 
“manufacture” and “composition of matter” as used in the 1790 and 
1793 Patent Acts, I looked in the PTO’s online database of all 
surviving patent grants.62  Since the United States issued patents 
without examination under the 1793 statute (changing to examination 
only with the 1836 statute),63 one would expect patents on plants 
during this period—if Americans did understand the words used in 
the statute to include plants.  Nevertheless, I found none.  The PTO 
database allows search of pre-1976 patents by only two fields:  
modern patent classification and patent number.64  First, I searched 
for all utility patents in the 1790-1975 database in classification 
“800," locating zero matching patents.65  Then I pulled all utility 
patent numbers from the relevant period, locating 1989 files.66  Using 
the search result list, I opened each file in order, locating not one 
patent on a seed, plant, plant part, or animal.   
59 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980). 
60 See id. (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). 
61 See id.; see also J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 130-31. 
62 See Patent Full-Text Database Contents, at http://www.uspto.gov/patft/help 
/contents.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2004). 
63 Compare The Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (1793), reprinted in 
WALTERSCHEID, supra note 20, at 479, with Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 
(1836), reprinted in WALTERSCHEID, supra note 20, at 497. 
64 See http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/search-adv.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2004). 
65 Search on file with author.  According to the PTO, class 800, subclass 295 is the 
classification used when the claimed invention is a “plant, seedling, plant seed, or plant 
part.”  USPTO Classification Definitions at 800-11 (Dec. 2000 ed.), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov.  According to the PTO’s database information, “Patent Full-Text 
Database Contents,” http://www.uspto.gov/patft/help/contents.htm, utility patents issued 
between 1790 and 1975 included four number runs: X1-X11,280; 1-3,930,270; RX1-
RX125; RE1-RE29,094.  The first available patent of each of the last three runs was issued 
in August 1836.  Since patents are issued in numerical order, the three runs were not 
relevant.  I then did a patent number search for all patent numbers starting with X.  This 
search located the 1989 records discussed in the text; these patents were issued between 
July 31, 1790 (Patent No. X1, to Samuel Hopkins, July 31, 1790 for a method of making 
potash) and July 1836 (Patent No. X9,900, to Winslow, on July 2, 1836, for a crate).  The 
highest X patent number result (X11,280) was an empty file. 
66 See search on file with author. 
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The J.E.M. Court’s theory of linguistic meaning is startling.  
Presumably, the J.E.M. Court meant that Americans from 1790 
through 1836 would have thought that “manufacture” or “composition 
of matter” included plants, if they had “recognized” that these 
statutory terms included living things, something “discovered” by the 
Supreme Court in 1980.67  I simply do not understand how a word can 
mean x in year y, if speakers of the language in year y do not use the 
word to mean x.  Word meaning is an empirical fact, not a neo-
Platonic form. 
As for the allegedly all-encompassing “any,” the Court has recently 
refused to read it as all-encompassing.  The Telecommunications Act 
of 1996 allows the Federal Communications Commission to preempt 
any state and local laws or regulations that “prohibit[] the ability of 
any entity” to provide telecommunications services.68  Yet eight 
Justices refused to accept this wording as including utilities owned by 
state or local government units.69  This refusal is especially 
interesting because state owned utilities were mentioned in the related 
hearings and they were expressly excluded from the coverage of 
another section of the 1996 Telecommunications Act.70  Clearly, 
Congress thought about state run telecommunications services while 
working on the 1996 Telecommunications Act.  In contrast, no one 
has provided this type of evidence demonstrating that the 1790, 1793, 
or 1952 Congress thought about utility patents on food grains.  Each 
time Congress actively considered full utility patent protection of 
such societal basics, it failed to enact this level of private control. 
Second, to support the claim that Congress had intended full utility 
patent protection for basic food crops, the Court relied on the 
legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act.71  However, the Court 
67 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
68 Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2000). 
69 See Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 124 S. Ct. 1555, 1560-61 (2004). 
70 See id. at 1567 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
71 Interestingly, the use of legislative history in Chakrabarty was accepted in J.E.M. by 
both Justices Thomas and Scalia, justices who usually insist on the incompetence of this 
type of evidence. See, e.g., Carter v. U.S., 530 U.S. 255, 270-72 (2000) (denigrating use of 
legislative history in statutory construction); Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. 
Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 783 n.12 (2000); see also Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air 
Quality Mgmt. Dist., 124 S. Ct. 1756, 1763 (2004) (recognizing that “not all members of 
this Court agree” on the statutory construction method of “delv[ing] into legislative 
history.”)  But see, e.g., BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1587, 1598 (2004) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (castigating the rest of the Court as “deliberately uninformed, and 
hence unconstrained,” because justices refused to follow clear direction in congressional 
report). 
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stood the legislative history on its head.  According to the Court, 
section 101 must be read broadly because Congress intended it to 
“include anything under the sun that is made by man.”72  The one 
sentence report paragraph reads:  “A person may have invented a 
machine or a manufacture, which may include anything under the sun 
that is made by man, but it is not necessarily patentable under section 
101 unless the conditions of the title are fulfilled.”73
The report says “may,” not “shall.”74  The purport of the sentence 
is a limitation on patentability, not an extension.  To paraphrase, the 
report states that regardless of the extent of section 101 patentable 
subject matter (even if, arguendo, it includes anything under the sun 
that is made by man), no alleged invention shall receive a patent grant 
unless it fulfills all the other complex provisions of 35 U.S.C. 
Third, the Court relied on a 1999 amendment to section 119 of the 
Patent Act –- the addition of subsection (f) allowing the use of foreign 
plant variety protection documents to set priority for related patents.  
This amendment, according to the opinion of the Court delivered by 
Justice Thomas, demonstrates that Congress “has even recognized the 
availability of utility patents for plants.”75  He seems to have 
overlooked section 119(f)’s language which, while granting priority, 
makes the prioritized filings “subject to the same conditions and 
requirements of this section as apply to applications for patents,” i.e., 
requires that utility patents not be granted unless all other sections of 
35 U.S.C. are met, including the section 101 limit on patentable 
subject matter —which Thomas is circularly construing in light of 
section 119(f).  Furthermore, as the petitioner in J.E.M. pointed out, 
this amendment was part of a rushed, middle of the night, insertion 
into an omnibus appropriations act.  The last minute additions to the 
bill were so enormous that no one could believe that Congresspersons 
72 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309. 
73 S. Rep. 82-1979 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2399. 
74 The Court has based decisions on the difference between the permissive “may,” and 
the commanding “shall.”  See Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 485 (1947)(“And 
when the same Rule uses both ‘may’ and ‘shall’, the normal inference is that each is used 
in its usual sense—the one act being permissive, the other mandatory.”)(citations omitted). 
75 See J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 145 (2001), 
referring to 35 U.S.C. § 119(f) which reads: 
Applications for plant breeder's rights filed in a WTO member country (or in a 
foreign UPOV Contracting Party) shall have the same effect for the purpose of the 
right of priority under subsections (a) through (c) of this section as applications for 
patents, subject to the same conditions and requirements of this section as apply to 
applications for patents. 
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read them before voting on the legislation.  Therefore, this 
amendment provides weak support for the subjective intent of a 
majority of the House and Senate—or even their staffers.76  Thomas’ 
use of this amendment, furthermore, is inconsistent with his lack of 
interest in what the 1930 and 1970 Congresses thought about the 
meaning of section 101.77
Close scrutiny of the section 119(f) argument further undermines 
its vitality.  Section 119(f) deals with PPA “plant patents,” not utility 
patents on plants.  This section neither recognizes nor requires the 
existence of full utility patents on sexually reproduced plants.  The 
plain language of the subsection allows priority.  It does not purport 
to add anything to section 101 patentable subject matter.  It does not 
purport to recognize the existence of any U.S. utility patents which 
could be supported by international breeders’ rights certificates; the 
set may be empty.78  Furthermore, section 119(f) does not define 
international breeders’ rights certificates as only including plants 
outside the United States’ PPA “plant patents,” which lack the full 
power of U.S. utility patents.  U.S. plant patents are governed by 35 
U.S.C. §§ 161-64.  However, on most matters, these specific sections 
merely provide, by reference, the provisions that cover U.S. utility 
patents.79  Plant patent priority based on international filings, 
including breeders’ certificates, is covered by 35 U.S.C. § 119(f).  
Furthermore, some foreign countries do cover asexually produced 
plants (subject matter of U.S. “plant patents”) with breeders’ 
76 Reply Brief for Petitioners at 7-8, J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 
Inc., No. 99-1996, 2001 WL 811687 (U.S. July 16, 2001). 
77 See J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 135 (referring to PPA legislative history, “[w]hatever 
Congress may have believed about the state of patent law and the science of plant breeding 
in 1930, plants have always had the potential to fall within the general subject matter of § 
101 . . . .”) (emphasis in original); id. at 141 (referring to PVPA, “[t]he relevant statements 
in the legislative history reveal nothing more than the limited view of plant breeding taken 
by some members of Congress who believed that patent protection was unavailable for 
sexually reproduced plants.”) 
78 The Supreme Court has recognized empty classes of potentially trademark-worthy 
res.  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 211 (2000): 
Nothing in § 2, however, demands the conclusion that every category of mark 
necessarily includes some marks “by which the goods of the applicant may be 
distinguished from the goods of others” without secondary meaning—that in every 
category some marks are inherently distinctive.  Indeed, with respect to at least one 
category of mark—colors—we have held that no mark can ever be inherently 
distinctive. 
(emphasis and internal quotations in original; citations omitted). 
79 “The provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions shall apply to patents 
for plants, except as otherwise provided.”  35 U.S.C. § 161 ¶2 (2000). 
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certificates.80  Section 119(f) provides that these international 
breeders’ certificates can be used to create priority for U.S. plant 
patents.  The section is neither superfluous nor only marginally useful 
absent utility patents on plants.  In short, the Court overlooked the 
cross reference between 35 U.S.C. § 161 and § 119(f).81
Furthermore, section 119(f) was merely a technical amendment.  
Justice Thomas’ J.E.M. opinion downplayed the importance of the 
1952 move of plant patents out of section 101, a move which strongly 
implied that plants had never been considered inside the subject 
matter of utility patents.82  Justice Thomas and the rest of the majority 
were “loath to interpret what was essentially a housekeeping measure 
as an affirmative decision by Congress to deny sexually reproduced 
plants patent protection under § 101.”83  They did, however, rely 
strongly on section 119(f), which was merely a “technical 
amendment” required to fulfill one requirement of the International 
Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants.84
The enactment history of section 119(f) is also indicative of its 
unimportance.  The measure first appeared in House Bill 3460, the 
Morehead-Schoeder Patent Reform Act of 1996.  According to the 
80 I base this conclusion on the reservation which accompanied the United States’ 
ratification of the 1991 version of the International Union for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants (“UPOV”), UPOV Notification No. 69, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/notdocs/en/upov/treaty_upov_69.html?printable=true (last 
visited March 21, 2004) (“Pursuant to Article 35(2), the United States will continue to 
provide protection for asexually reproduced varieties by an industrial property title other 
than a breeder’s right and will not, therefore, apply the terms of the Convention to those 
varieties.”).  This version of the UPOV entered into force in the United States on Feb. 22, 
1999.  See id. 
81 See J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 144 (“Crucially, § 119(f) is part of the general provisions of 
Title 35, not the specific chapter of the PPA . . . .”)(emphasis added).  But see Jones v. 
R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 124 S. Ct. 1836, 1842 (2004) (“We hesitate to place too much 
significance on the location of a statute in the United States Code.”). 
82 The J.E.M. dissent concluded that all plants had been removed from the utility patent 
statues by passage of the PPA in 1930, prior to the 1952 move of the plant patent act into 
its own corner of Title 35.  See J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 147-53 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
83 See J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 138. 
84 S. REP. NO. 105-42, at *43, 1997 WL 394243 (“In addition, Title VI makes some 
miscellaneous and technical changes . . . that provide an international right of priority for 
plant breeder’s rights.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 106-287, pt. I, at *66, 1999 WL 569140 
(“Generally, Title VII consists of seven largely-unrelated provisions that make needed 
clarifying and technical changes to the Patent Act.”); H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 106-464, at 
*145, 1999 WL 1095089 (“Subtitle H consists of seven largely-unrelated provisions that 
make clarifying and technical changes to the Patent Act.”). 
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accompanying report, no hearings were held on the provision.85  The 
measure was described as part of the international priority system 
required by the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) Agreement.  Specifically, some member countries lacked 
plant or utility patents on plants and were entitled to priority based on 
breeder’s certificates.86  The report did imply that the United States 
had full utility patents on plants.87  The TRIPS Agreement, 
interestingly, does not require full utility patent protection be granted 
on sexually reproduced plants.88  The same bill provision, with almost 
identical legislative history (including the lack of hearings), was 
included in the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997,89 
the 21st Century Patent System Improvement Act of 1997,90 the 
American Inventors Protection Act of 1999,91 and the Intellectual 
Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999.92  
Section 119(f) was finally passed by Congress as part of the Fiscal 
Year 2000 Consolidated Appropriations Act, House Bill 3194.93  
85 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-784, *30, 1996 WL 938260 (“With the exception of the title 
containing miscellaneous provisions [including section 119(f)], each title consists of an 
independent bill that was the subject of comprehensive hearings . . . .”). 
86 See id. at *81-82. 
87 See id. at *82. 
Because section 119 presently addresses only patents and inventors’ certificates, 
applicants from those countries [which only have breeder’s certificates for plants] 
are technically unable to base a priority claim on a foreign application for a plant 
breeder’s right when seeking plant patent or utility protection for a plant variety in 
this country.   
Id.  Furthermore, seeking a utility patent does not imply that one will be granted.  The 
amendment dealt only with priority, not with patentability.   
88  
Members may also exclude from patentability: . . . (b) plants and animals other than 
micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for the production of plants 
or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes.  However, 
members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by 
an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof . . . . 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), art. 27, § 3(b). 
89 See S. REP. NO. 105-42, supra note 84, at *59, *112. 
90 See H.R. REP. NO. 105-39, at *28, *29, 1997 WL 136374. 
91 See H.R. REP. NO. 106-287, pt. I, at *28, *66-67, 1999 WL 569140. 
92 See H.R. CONF. REP. 106-464, at *146, 1999 WL 1095089. 
93 H.R. 3194 (Division B), Pub. L. 106-113 (Nov. 29, 1999).  The Brief of the United 
States misleadingly cites to Conf. Rep. 106-464 as if it accompanied the bill which enacted 
§ 119(f).  See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at *19-
20, J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., No. 99-1996, 2001 WL 689516 
(characterizing Rep. 464 as “the Conference Report that accompanied new Section 
119(f).”). 
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House Bill 3194 engulfed section 119(f) by incorporating Senate Bill 
1948.  No report was ever issued to accompany Senate Bill 1948.94  
The report accompanying House Bill 3194 incorporated only the text 
of 35 U.S.C. § 119(f).  It included no discussion of the reason for the 
section.  It did not, therefore, include the language from earlier 
congressional reports implying the existence of U.S. utility patents on 
plants.95
Let me be clear, I am not claiming that enacted language is not 
positive law absent proof that a majority of congresspersons thought 
through the language.  Legislation becomes law when a majority of 
both the House and the Senate vote “yea,” and the president timely 
signs the bill.96  An additional, subjective intent requirement would 
create chaos.  However, I am arguing that, when enacted language 
clearly has not been thought through, the courts should enforce only 
what the language expressly states—as opposed to using that 
language to imply a major change in policy by Congress.  The major 
policy change involved here is slamming shut the research (and the 
seed-saving) exceptions to private control of major food crops.  I find 
unacceptable the Supreme Court’s willingness to read such a policy 
change into law without a clearer congressional statement; this move 
is even more unacceptable in situations, such as this one, where the 
record demonstrates that the policy change was actively considered, 
and, after consideration, Congress said no.  Furthermore, as discussed 
next, the Court strongly relied on a much less meaningful nonaction 
allegedly supporting plant patentability. 
Fourth, the J.E.M. Court relied on congressional nonaction in the 
face of PTO grant of full utility patents on plants since 1985,97 an 
action taken by the PTO in reliance on Diamond v. Chakrabarty.98  At 
94 See Bill Summary and Status report on both bills available at 
http://www.thomas.loc.gov (last visited March 20, 2004). 
95 See H.R. REP. NO. 106-479 (available in Cong. Rec. daily version of Nov. 17, 1999 
at H12230-12609).  The text of S.1948 was incorporated by reference into Division B of 
this report.  See CONG. REC. of Nov. 17, 1999 at H.12239. 
96 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3. 
97 See In re Hibbard, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (1985)(reversing examiner’s rejection of 
an utility patent application on a plant for absence of statutory subject matter). 
98 See J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 144-45 
(2001). 
[T]he PTO has assigned utility patents for plants for at least 16 years and there has 
been no indication from either Congress or agencies with expertise that such 
coverage is inconsistent with the PVPA or the PPA . . . .  [In reliance on 
Chakrabarty, the PTO has issued] some 1,800 utility patents for plants. 
Id. 
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best, congressional nonaction is ambiguous evidence; more 
commonly it has no probative value whatever.  As the Court has 
repeatedly stated “to give weight to the nonaction of Congress [is] to 
venture into speculative unrealities.”99  “As a general matter, [the 
Court is] reluctant to draw inferences from Congress’ failure to 
act.”100
If Congress re-enacts the exact language which has been 
interpreted by the courts, at the most, the re-enactment may imply 
congressional endorsement of the judicial gloss on statutory language, 
but only in those few situations where Congress has “prolonged and 
acute awareness” of that interpretation.101  While the 1952 Patent Act 
re-enacted most of the earlier language of 35 U.S.C. § 101, no prior 
decision had declared plants to be within the subject matter of utility 
patents.  The Court did not misinterpret section 101 to cover 
“anything under the sun that is made by man” until 1980.102   The 
1952 re-enactment of “manufacture” and “composition of matter,” 
therefore, has no probative value.  The extensive reach of 
Chakrabarty’s mistake has only slowly become visible.  The Court’s 
reliance, in J.E.M., on post-1985 congressional nonaction is 
inconsistent with its own nonaction jurisprudence: 
There are vast differences between legislating by doing nothing and 
legislating by positive enactment, both in the processes by which 
the will of Congress is derived and stated and in the clarity and 
certainty of the expression of its will.  And there are many reasons, 
other than to indicate approval of what courts have done, why 
Congress may fail to take affirmative action to repudiate their 
misconstruction of its duly adopted laws.  Among them may be the 
sheer pressure of other and more important business. . . .[T]here 
99 See FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 610 n.11 (1996) (quoting Helvering v. 
Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 120 (1940)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 609-
10 (discussing list of cases supporting nonprobative value of congressional nonaction).  
But see Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 536-37 (1988) (White, J., dissenting) 
(objecting to majority’s reliance on congressional non-action). 
100 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 632 (1993) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
101 See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978); see also Lindahl v. Office of 
Pers. Mgmt., 470 U.S. 768, 802-06, & n.3 (1985) (White, J., dissenting); see also Toucey 
v. New York Life Ins., 314 U.S. 118, 140-41 (1941) (limiting importance of congressional 
nonaction to circumstances where Congress should be expected to act, such as those where 
a provision has “been the subject of comprehensive legislative re-examination.”). 
102 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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may be a strong and proper tendency to trust to the courts to correct 
their own errors.103 
Finally, the Court had the facts wrong on two points important to 
the majority.  One has already been discussed, the relationship 
between section 119(f) and PPA plant patents.  The second is 
discussed at length in part two of this paper.  The Court believed that 
scientific advances had produced tools allowing applicants to write 
enabling descriptions of sexually reproduced plants, thus undoing the 
section 112(1) problem perceived by Congress when enacting the 
PPA in 1930 and the PVPA in 1970.  The Court dismissed the 
legislative history statements that utility patents were not available on 
sexually reproduced plants as merely “illustrat[ing] . . . that . . . 
Congress believed that plants were not patentable under § 101, both 
because they were living things, and because in practice they could 
not meet the stringent description requirement.  Yet both of these 
premises were disproved over time.”104  As discussed below, the 
record demonstrates that the PTO (not Congress) gutted section 
112(1)'s “stringent description requirement” for biological material by 
approving use of specimen deposits as a replacement for section 
112(1)'s required written description. 
D.  The Missed Alternative 
The United States Supreme Court did not need to follow this path.  
Canada did not do so.  Canada’s statutory list of patentable subject 
matter almost literally matches 35 U.S.C. § 101.105  Canada’s highest 
court followed the United States Supreme Court in recognizing the 
patentability of engineered micro-organisms.106  Yet the Supreme 
Court of Canada decided not to read “manufacture” and  
“composition of matter” broadly enough to include the Harvard 
oncomouse.107  The Canadian Supreme Court, recognizing that the 
Canadian patent office (like its United States counterpart) does not 
103 Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 22-23 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring) 
(footnotes and internal citations omitted). 
104 J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 134 (discussing the 1930 Congress and the PPA); see id. at 141-
42 (making similar statements about the 1970 Congress and the PVPA). 
105 R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 2 (1985) (Can.) (“Any art, process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter . . . .”). 
106 Harvard Coll. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] S.C.R. 45 (“Micro-
organisms produced en masse as chemical compounds are produced and are formed in 
such large numbers that any measurable quantity will possess uniform properties and 
characteristics.  The same could not be said for plants and animals.”). 
107 Id. 
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have the authority to refuse patents on non-statutory grounds,108 
declined to extend patent coverage to higher life forms in the absence 
of clear legislative decision—the opposite of the position taken by the 
United States Supreme Court.  Higher life forms, the Canadian court 
recognized, possess attributes not clearly captured by the terms 
“manufacture,” “machine,” and “composition of matter.”  The 
Canadian court recognized that a policy of rewarding or incentivizing 
invention in general, does not require the inclusion of higher life 
forms inside patentable subject matter.109
The United States Supreme Court could have taken the same path.  
The Court has repeatedly used clear statement rules110 to pass 
problems back to Congress.  In J.E.M., the Court insisted on choosing 
the widest possible reading of section 101, even though this reading 
wiped out two congressionally-created public interest exceptions to 
private intellectual property control over basic food crops.  The Court 
chose this wide reading despite the absence of any evidence that 
Congress had ever made a considered decision to kill the public 
interest exceptions it had created.  The Court, nevertheless, insisted 
that Congress had made the choice. 
The J.E.M. decision is legal formalism run amok.  I prefer the 
Canadian Supreme Court’s “common sense” in Harvard College v. 
Canada.111
108 Id. at 3 (“Section 40 of the Patent Act does not give the Commissioner any 
discretion to refuse a patent on the basis of public policy considerations independent of 
any express provision in the Act.”).  See also 35 U.S.C. § 102 (“A person shall be entitled 
to a patent unless—. . . .”). 
109 See id. at ¶ 184 (“[T]he central objects of the Act are ‘to advance research and 
development and to encourage broader economic activity,’” which does not imply that all 
inventions are patentable.). 
110 See, e.g., Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 124 S. Ct. 1555, 1559 (2004) (referring to 
clear statement rule of Gregory v. Aschroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1992), requiring a clear 
statement from Congress before courts will read a federal statute to “constrain[] traditional 
state authority to order its government.”); id. at 1566 (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that 
statute at issue “simply does not provide the clear statement which would be required by 
Gregory”). 
111 See Harvard Coll. v. Canada, [2002] S.C.R. 45, ¶ 199 (“The distinction between 
lower and higher life forms, though not explicit in the Act, nonetheless is defensible on the 
basis of the common sense differences between the two.”).  Unfortunately, after the 
conference which generated this paper, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a farmer 
had infringed Monsanto’s patent on a gene by planting seed which produced canola plants 
containing the claimed gene.  Percy Schmeiser v. Monsanto Canada, Inc., [2004] S.C.R. 
34.  Since the farmer had not gained additional profit from his harvest by taking advantage 
of the plants’ resistance to Round-Up®, no damages were allowable.  Because Monsanto’s 
Canadian patent on Round-Up® had expired before these plants had been grown, and  
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II 
ELIMINATING THE REQUIREMENT OF AN ENABLING, WRITTEN 
DESCRIPTION 
The situation is even more bizarre.  For utility patents on plants, 
the PTO is waiving one of the basic requirements for all utility 
patents—an enabling written description.  Congress has never 
authorized this lowering of the patentability requirements.  This part 
describes the time line on this usurpation of legislative authority.  
While dry, this is the most important section of this Article.  J.E.M. 
has been decided.  To overturn it, Congress would have to be 
motivated to work against politically powerful, large business 
interests.  However, the current situation might be ameliorated by 
Supreme Court112 consideration of the PTO’s usurpation of the 
authority to allow mass violation of 35 U.S.C. § 112.113  Furthermore, 
such a contest should not be undermined by Chevron deference to the 
PTO.114
Since their inception, U.S. utility patents have required the patent 
grantee to provide a sufficiently clear, written description of the 
alleged invention.  “Sufficiently clear” means a description which 
would enable a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art to practice 
the invention.115  This requirement continues in the current statute, 
because Canadian law does not recognize patents on seeds or canola plants themselves, 
this decision raises many additional issues beyond those addressed in this Article. 
112 As discussed infra, the Federal Circuit has already approved this usurpation.  See 
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc. (Enzo II), 323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
113 The petitioners in J.E.M. did not raise any issue except lack of § 101 patentable 
subject matter.  See J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 131 (“Petitioners do not allege that Pioneer’s 
patents are invalid for failure to meet the requirements for a utility patent.”). 
114 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 
(1984) (requiring judicial deference to agency interpretation of statutes and related 
regulations when Congress has entrusted an agency with implementation of the statutory 
material at issue, unless Congress has clearly spoken to the exact issue).  I base this 
conclusion on the non-inclusion of standards of patentability within the PTO’s rule making 
authority, see infra text accompanying note 165, and the statute’s clear requirement that 
the specification contain an enabling “written description” (i.e., a writing which both 
describes and enables) 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1. 
115  
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the 
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it 
is most nearly connected, to make and use the same . . . . 
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1.  Federal Circuit case law recognizes three separate requirements 
imposed by § 112, ¶ 1, called in short-hand “written description,” “enablement,” and “best 
mode.”  See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 358 F.3d 916, 921 (Fed. Cir.  
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where the patent application must contain the enabling, written 
description.116  While not part of the application, the 1790 Act 
required patent grantees to provide enabling descriptions as soon as 
their patents were issued.117  Under the 1793 Act, grant of a patent 
was a mere ministerial act; the application was not examined for its 
worthiness.118  Nevertheless, applications filed pursuant to the 1793 
Act were required to contain an enabling written description and, in 
certain circumstances, to be accompanied by deposits.119  The Patent 
Act of 1836 reinstituted examination of applications prior to the 
issuance of a patent.120  Applications were required to include 
enabling written descriptions and, in certain circumstances, deposits 
as well.121  As mentioned earlier, the current Patent Act requires an 
2004).  The Federal Circuit might consider my argument to involve both “written 
description” and “enablement.” 
116 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1. 
117  
And be it further enacted, that the Grantee or Grantees of each Patent shall, at the 
time of granting the same, deliver to the Secretary of State a Specification in 
Writing, containing a description, accompanied with drafts or models, and 
explanations and models (if the nature of the invention or discovery will admit of a 
Model) of the thing or things by him or them invented or discovered, and described 
as aforesaid in the said Patents, which Specification shall be so particular, and said 
Models so exact, as . . . to enable a Workman or other person skilled in the Art or 
Manufacture whereof it is a branch or wherewith it may be nearest connected, to 
make, construct, or use the same . . . which Specification shall be filed in the Office 
of the said Secretary. . . . 
Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109, reprinted in WALTERSCHEID, supra note 20, at 465. 
118 See Patent Act of 1793 § 1, 1 Stat. 318, reprinted in WALTERSCHEID, supra note 20, 
at 479-80. 
119  
And be it further enacted, that every inventor, before he can receive a patent . . . 
shall deliver a written description of his invention, and of the manner of using, or 
process of compounding the same, in such full, clear, and exact terms as to . . . 
enable any person skilled in the art or science of which it is a branch, or with which 
it is most nearly connected, to make, compound, and use the same . . . .  [A]nd he 
shall accompany the whole with drawings and written references, where the nature 
of the case admits of drawings, or with specimens of the ingredients, and of the 
composition of matter, sufficient in quantity for the purpose of experiment, where 
the invention is of a composition of matter; which . . . shall be filed in the office of 
the Secretary of State . . . .  And such inventor shall, moreover, deliver a model of 
his machine, provided the Secretary shall deem such model to be necessary. 
Patent Act of 1793 § 3, 1 Stat. 318, reprinted in WALTERSCHEID, supra note 20, at 480-81. 
120 Patent Act of 1836 § 7, 5 Stat. 117, reprinted in WALTERSCHEID, supra note 20, at 
497, 500 (“[T]he Commissioner shall make, or cause to be made, an examination of the 
alleged new invention or discovery. . . [and if the application fulfils statutory 
requirements] it shall be his duty to issue a patent therefor.”). 
121  
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application to contain an enabling, written description; according to 
another section of the statute, the PTO has the discretion to require a 
model or specimen.122  Nothing in the current statute allows 
replacement of the statutorily-required written description by a 
deposit. 
The enabling description requirement makes sure that the public 
obtains practical use of the invention after the patent term expires.  It 
also allows everyone interested in the art (including competitors) to 
study the technology while the patent is in force and, if they wish to 
compete, to invent around the patent.123  Congress has lowered this 
requirement for plant patents124 and for plant variety certificates.125  
But before any inventor shall receive a patent for any such new invention or 
discovery, he shall deliver a written description of his invention or discovery, and 
the manner and process of making, constructing, using and compounding the same, 
in such full, clear, and exact terms, avoiding unnecessary prolixity, as to enable any 
person skilled in the art or science to which it appertains, or with which it is most 
nearly connected, to make, construct, compound, and use the same . . . .  He shall, 
furthermore, accompany the whole with a drawing or drawings, and written 
references, where the nature of the case admits of drawings, or with specimens of 
ingredients, and of composition of matter, sufficient in quantity for the purpose of 
experiment, where the invention or discovery is of a composition of matter . . . and 
he shall moreover furnish a model of his invention, in all cases which admit of a 
representation by a model. . . . 
Id. at § 6, reprinted in WALTERSCHEID, supra note 20, at 499-500. 
122 “The Director may require the applicant to furnish a model of convenient size to 
exhibit advantageously the several parts of his invention. 
“When the invention relates to a composition of matter, the Director may require the 
applicant to furnish specimens or ingredients for the purpose of inspection or experiment.”  
35 U.S.C. § 114. 
123 The “written description” requirement serves a teaching function as a “quid pro 
quo” in which the public is given “meaningful disclosure in exchange for being excluded 
from practicing the invention for a limited period of time.”  Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. 
Searle & Co., Inc., 358 F.3d 916, 922 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. 
Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  This policy basis for the written 
description requirement was noted by the J.E.M. majority.  J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. 
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001). 
124 35 U.S.C. § 162 (2000) (“No plant patent shall be declared invalid for 
noncompliance with section 112 of this title if the description is as complete as is 
reasonably possible.”). 
125 See 7 U.S.C. § 2422(2) (2000). 
A description of the variety setting forth its distinctiveness, uniformity, and stability 
and a description of the genealogy and breeding procedure, when known.  The 
Secretary may require amplification, including the submission of adequate 
photographs or drawings or plant specimens, if the description is not adequate or as 
complete as is reasonably possible, and submission of records or proof of 
ownership or of allegations made in the application.  An applicant may add to or 
correct the description at any time, before the certificate is issued, upon a showing 
acceptable to the Secretary that the revised description is retroactively accurate.   
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In addition to a written description, PVPA applicants must deposit in 
a “public repository,” and periodically replenish, “a viable sample of 
basic seed . . . necessary for propagation of the variety.”126  Congress 
has made no exceptions to the enabling, written description 
requirement for utility patents, but the PTO has done so. 
The acceptability of a deposit to fulfill the enabling description of 
section 112(1) is rooted in a 1970 decision by the now-defunct United 
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA),127 In re 
Argoudelis,128 reversing a PTO denial of a patent application.  
Argoudelis did not deal with a utility patent on a plant.  The case 
involved PTO rejection of claims for two new antibiotic compounds 
and a microbiological process for preparing these compounds.  Since 
the claims involved a product and the related process which required 
use of a specific micro-organism, then-current PTO guidelines 
required deposit of the needed micro-organism in a public depository.  
The applicant had made this deposit, but a few days later than 
required by PTO practice.  Before the deposit, however, the micro-
organism had been available in a university.129  On the sole ground 
that the allegedly enabling deposit had been made untimely, the PTO 
rejected the patent application. 
The CCPA described the issue as dealing with the date on which 
the application material was required to be enabling to the public—
not the acceptability of deposit material (as opposed to written words) 
for enablement.130  The court recognized that the PTO had allowed 
deposit of microbiological material for some fifteen years.131  The 
Courts shall protect others from any injustice which would result.  The Secretary 
may accept records of the breeder and of any official seed certifying agency in this 
country as evidence of stability where applicable. 
126 7 U.S.C. § 2422(4). 
127 The CCPA has been replaced by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  See 
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, Title I (creating the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit). 
128 434 F.2d 1390 (1970), 168 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 99, 58 C.C.P.A. 769. 
129 See id. at 1390-92. 
130 See id. at 1393 (“It is not necessary that the general public have access to the culture 
prior to the issuance of the patent.”) (emphasis added). 
131 See id. at 1393 n.5 (citing a treatise).  The PTO does have the authority to require 
deposit in addition to an enabling written description, but not instead of an enabling 
written description.  35 U.S.C. § 114 (“The Director may require the applicant to furnish a 
model of convenient size to exhibit advantageously the several parts of his invention.  
When the invention relates to a composition of matter, the Director may require the 
applicant to furnish specimens or ingredients for the purpose of inspection or 
experiment.”). 
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court also recognized that “because of the particular area of 
technology involved, [the applicant could] not sufficiently disclose by 
written word how to obtain the micro-organism starting material from 
nature.”132  The court also recognized that it did not have the power to 
grant “a general dispensation from the requirements of [section] 112,” 
similar to that legislatively granted in section 162, the Plant Patent 
Act.133  Additionally, the court recognized that it was dealing with an 
issue of first impression.134  Focusing on the date issue, the court held 
that deposit was timely and ordered the PTO to grant the patent. 
In 2002 the issue reached the Federal Circuit in Enzo Biochem, Inc. 
v. Gen-Probe, Inc.135   Enzo involved patent claims “directed toward 
nucleic acid probes that selectively hybridize to the genetic material 
of the bacteria that causes gonorrhea.”136  In Enzo I, a split panel held 
the patent invalid for failure to fulfill the written description 
requirement of section 112(1).  The majority explained Argoudelis 
and other deposit cases as holding that deposits may fulfill the 
enablement requirement of section 112(1).  “Written description,” 
however, was deemed a separate requirement which could not be met 
by deposits.  The panel had two overlapping reasons.  Most basic, the 
“statutory mandate” requires a “written description.”137  Second, 
policy dictates that “[t]he disclosure must allow one skilled in the art 
to visualize or recognize the identity of the subject matter of the 
claim[;]”138 “to require the public to go to a public depository and 
perform experiments to identify an invention is not consistent with the 
statutory requirement to describe one’s invention in the 
132 In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
133 Id. 
134 See id. (“As far as we are able to determine, an issue like the one facing us has never 
been decided by the courts in this country; therefore, as a matter of first impression, it 
requires that we analyze anew all of the statutes, law, and circumstances pertaining to this 
issue.”). 
135 (Enzo II), 323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (panel reconsideration) (holding patent 
valid), vacating Enzo I, 285 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding patent invalid for failure 
to fulfill written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1).  Enzo was an 
infringement case.  The issue on appeal was the district court grant of summary judgment 
to the alleged infringer on the ground that the patent claims allegedly infringed were 
invalid for failure to meet the written description requirement of § 112, ¶ 1.  Enzo I, 285 
F.3d at 1015. 
136 Enzo I, 285 F.3d. at 1015. 
137 Id. at 1021 (emphasis original). 
138 Id. at 1018. 
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specifications.”139  While the panel did not mention the problem, in 
many instances using the deposit material to understand the patent 
would be infringement.140  The panel, however, rapidly vacated its 
first opinion and issued a contrary decision, Enzo II.141
In Enzo II, the Federal Circuit panel continued to recognize that 
deposit had begun as a method of fulfilling the enablement 
requirement,142 but added this key paragraph changing its conclusion 
as to whether a deposit can fulfill the separate “written description” 
requirement of section 112(1): 
Enzo asserts that the claimed sequences are inherently described by 
reference to deposits of three sequences that are within the scope of 
its claims.  Whether reference to a deposit of a nucleotide sequence 
may adequately describe that sequence is an issue of first 
impression in this court.  In light of the history of biological 
deposits for patent purposes, the goals of the patent law, and the 
practical difficulties of describing unique biological materials in a 
written description, we hold that reference in the specification to a 
deposit in a public depository, which makes its contents accessible 
to the public when it is not otherwise available in written form, 
constitutes an adequate description of the deposited material 
sufficient to comply with the written description requirement of § 
112, ¶ 1.143
Notice that the Federal Circuit does not claim any statutory 
authority for its change of course.  The Enzo II opinion assumes the 
patentability of inventions incapable of written description and, to 
preserve their patentability, guts the statutory requirement of a 
description in writing.  This move is especially disingenuous in light 
of the Supreme Court’s explication in J.E.M. that plants now may 
obtain utility patents because they are describable in writing—
shrugging off Congress’ earlier statements that plants were not 
patentable as grounded on the belief that plant inventions could not be 
described in writing.  Enzo I and Enzo II were decided after J.E.M., 
but neither discusses the Supreme Court’s reliance on written 
139 Id. at 1021.  While I agree with Enzo I on the insufficiency of written description, I 
believe that enablement is also lacking.  The statutory language clearly seems to require 
that the “written description” itself be enabling. 
140 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) (“making” and “using” a claimed invention both 
constitute infringement). 
141 Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc. (Enzo II), 323 F.3d 956, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(holding that disputed issues of material fact prevented summary judgment on the factual 
issue of sufficiency of a written description).  Because the panel reconsidered, the case 
was not reheard en banc.  See id. at 970. 
142 See id. at 965 (discussing in re Argoudelis). 
143 Id. at 964-65 (emphasis added). 
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descriptions in J.E.M.144  The public interest was betrayed by the 
Federal Circuit’s announcement of the non-existence of a limit on 
patentability shortly after the Supreme Court relied heavily on the 
existence of that specific limit; as long as the Federal Circuit retains 
this posture it continues to disserve the public.145
What both the Argoudelis and Enzo II courts declined to recognize 
is that Congress has never decided that deposit is acceptable as a 
replacement for a section 112(1) written description.146  This lack of 
congressional action undermines the acceptability of deposit for any 
requirement of section 112(1).  The statute said in 1970, and still says, 
a “written description” with listed qualities.  When Congress created 
quasi-patent protection for asexually reproduced plants and sexually 
reproduced plants, it enacted lesser “description” requirements than 
section 112(1).  In Argoudelis the applicant wanted a weaker deposit 
requirement.  The PTO only wanted a deposit made earlier, in 
accordance with its own rules.  Neither party had any reason to argue 
that the PTO lacked the power to weaken Congress’ statutes by 
substituting a deposit (which would only be available at one or a 
limited set of locations and interactive inspection of which might 
constitute infringement) for a written description (which could be 
consulted more easily and perusal of which would not constitute 
infringement). 
To a believer in separation of powers, Enzo II is more disturbing.  
After noticing at least part of the statutory problem with deposit, the 
panel blithely opted to ignore statutory language to increase ease of 
patentability.  Enzo II does not even deign to reply to Enzo I’s 
practical critiques of the availability of deposits to the members of the 
public wishing to visualize the claimed invention. 
While not fully explained in Enzo I, the public availability 
difference between a written description and a deposit has become 
even more important in practice since the CCPA decided In re 
Argoudelis in 1970.  First, one can now obtain full text patents (with 
144 J.E.M. is cited by the Enzo II dissent on a different issue.  See Enzo II, 323 F.3d at 
977 (Rader, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Supreme Court in J.E.M. did not recognize a 
separate description requirement in § 112, ¶ 1). 
145 The judges who dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc had no problem with 
deposits, they wanted to eliminate any “written description” requirement separate from 
enablement.  See Enzo II, 323 F.3d at 977 (“In later [patent statutes], this notice function 
was assigned to claims, leaving enablement as the only purpose of the ‘written description’ 
language.”). 
146 The code allows the PTO to require drawings, models, or deposits to supplement the 
§ 112, ¶ 1 enabling written description.  35 U.S.C. §§ 113-114 (2002). 
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drawings) from any computer linked to the Internet.147  Second, 
deposits underlying utility patents on seeds are not always accessible 
to the anonymous public before the patent has expired.  As the J.E.M. 
majority recognized, the PTO’s regulations require that once a utility 
patent is issued, the depository must provide samples of the deposit 
material to the public upon request (presumably for a fee).148  
However, the same regulations allow the patent holder to require 
written notification from the depository of each such sample, 
including the name and address of the requestor, and the date the 
sample was requested.149  If the seed or plant part deposited is 
claimed in the utility patent, making any “use” of the deposited 
material inside the United States would be patent infringement.150  
Perhaps accepting such a shipment outside the United States (inside a 
jurisdiction where the seed or plant part was not protected under a 
national patent) would not be infringement, but a contrary argument 
could be made.151  At least inside the United States, therefore, a 
requestor would have no legal way of learning the science “disclosed” 
by the deposit without infringing—quite a chill on acquiring 
knowledge, especially since the putative plaintiff has timely notice of 
a requestor’s probable infringement, his name, and his address—
147 See United States Patent and Trademark Office Website, at 
http://www.uspto.gov/patft/index.html (last visited July 19, 2004) (gateway to PTO patent 
search functions). 
148 J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) 
(citing 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.801-809); 37 C.F.R. § 1.808(a)(2) (2001) (“Subject to paragraph (b) 
of this section, all restrictions imposed by the depositor on the availability to the public of 
the deposited material will be irrevocably removed upon the granting of the patent.”). 
149 37 C.F.R. § 1.808(2)(b) (“The depositor may contract with the depository to require 
that samples of a deposited biological material shall be furnished only if a request for a 
sample, during the term of the patent:  (1) Is in writing or other tangible form and dated; 
(2) Contains the name and address of the requesting party and the accession number of the 
deposit; and (3) Is communicated in writing by the depository to the depositor along with 
the date on which the sample was furnished and the name and address of the party to 
whom the sample was furnished.”).  But see U.S. Patent No. 6,329,579 (issued Dec. 11, 
2001) (“Applicant imposes no restrictions on the availability of the deposited material 
from the [depository].”). 
150 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2003) (“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever 
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the 
United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of 
the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”) (emphasis added). 
151 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1)-(2) (making infringing “suppl[ing] . . . from the United 
States all or a substantial portion” of a patented combination in certain circumstances).  
See also Schmeiser v. Monsanto Canada, Inc., 239 D.L.R. (4th) 271 (May 21, 2004) 
(holding that growing a plant containing a patented transgene is infringement of the patent 
on the transgene even though Canada does not allow utility patents on seeds or plants). 
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notice, furthermore, creating a writing that might be used in court as 
evidence of his action. 
Argoudelis and its immediate progeny did not involve this level of 
de facto secrecy; the courts relied on public availability of these 
deposits as soon as the patent issued.152  The deposited material’s use 
(by itself) did not appear to be infringement.153  The current 
regulation allowing the depositor to contract for information on each 
sample was not yet in place.154  The current limitation on access 
during the pendency of the patent right is a major change in policy.  
Without meaningful public access to the deposit, the patent holder can 
delay (for years) others’ access to information about scientific 
advances, information that might fuel other discoveries.  This PTO 
maneuver resembles the notorious refusal of William Thornton, the 
152 The early cases involving § 112 deposits involve deposit of material necessary to 
practice the invention, but not of the res claimed in the patent.  Such deposits have other 
uses than actions infringing the supported patent.  This supporting material was required to 
be publicly available as soon as the patent issued.  In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 1394 
(C.C.P.A. 1970) (allowing patent inter alia because depository is “under a contractual 
obligation . . . to supply samples to anyone seeking them once the patent issues.”); 
Feldman v. Anunstrup, 517 F.2d 1352, 1355 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (allowing patent inter 
alia because “the restrictions on access to [the deposit] were removed and the culture was 
made ‘open to the public.’”); In re Lundak, 773 F.2d 1216, 1222 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
(allowing patent inter alia because depository provides “assurance of availability of the 
material to the public after the grant of the patent.”). 
153 The Solicitor General’s statement to the J.E.M. Court on this subject seems 
misleading, though based on the accurate statement that deposits supporting PVPA 
certificates are not open to the public during the term of the certificate, while deposits 
supporting utility patents are technically available. 
Seeds deposited in conjunction with a utility patent, by contrast to those tied to 
PVPA certificates, are immediately in the public domain, although no infringing 
use may be made of them until the patent term expires.  See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.801 - 
1.809 (1990) (rules for disclosure of biotechnology inventions through deposits); 
see generally Ajinimoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 228 F.3d 1338, 1345-
46 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (discussing enabling disclosure through deposit).  Petitioners 
therefore are incorrect in suggesting (Br. 29-30 n.10) that respondent has made a 
less complete disclosure of its patented inventions than would have been required 
under the PVPA.   
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at *25 n.12, J.E.M. 
AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., No. 99-1996, 2001 WL 689516.  Ajinimoto, 
furthermore, merely relies on Lundak which, as discussed infra text accompanying note 
170, merely relies on Argoudelis.  See Ajinimoto, 228 F.3d at 1346. 
154 The final rule was adopted effective January 1, 1990.  See 54 Fed. Reg. 34864 (Aug. 
22, 1989) (adopting final rule) (“Where an invention is or relies on a biological material 
which cannot be described in writing alone, and access to the biological material is 
necessary to satisfy the statutory requirements for patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 
these rules prescribe the procedures and conditions for making a deposit that will satisfy 
these requirements.”). 
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first United States Superintendent of Patents, to allow public access to 
granted patents, despite the contrary, written opinion of the Attorney 
General.155
Additionally, written specifications are enabling in fact as long as 
any copy of the document is available (hopefully forever).  The PTO 
regulations require maintenance of biotechnology patent deposits for 
only a limited time, albeit definitely beyond the patent term.156
In 1990, Congress did take up the issue of deposits for 
biotechnology patents, but did not grant the PTO the authority to 
substitute deposit for a section 112(1) written description.  House Bill 
5982 would have amended section 112(1) by adding:  “With respect 
to an invention involving biological material, the Commissioner may 
accept a deposit of biological material to satisfy any requirement of 
this section if made accessible under such conditions as the 
Commissioner may require.”157  The bill would also have limited 
patentable subject matter by excluding human beings,158 and created 
an experimental use exception to patent infringement.159  House Bill 
5982, however, never became law. 
The report accompanying House Bill 5982 refers to a statement 
and related letter from Donald J. Quigg, then Assistant Secretary of 
the Commerce Department and Commissioner of Patents and 
Trademarks.160  Commissioner Quigg disliked any weakening of 
155 Issued patents have been public records, publicly available since the first U.S. Patent 
Act.  See Patent Act of 1790, § 3, 1 Stat. 109, reprinted in WALTERSCHEID, supra note 20, 
at 463, 466 (making it “the duty of the Secretary” to allow “any person” to make a copy of 
a specification or model of any issued patent upon application).  But see WALTERSCHEID, 
supra note 20, at 281-304 (recounting Superintendent of Patents William Thornton’s 
twenty-year refusal to release patent information despite contrary opinion of the Attorney 
General). 
156 37 C.F.R. § 1.806 provides: 
A deposit made before or during pendency of an application for patent shall be 
made for a term of at least thirty (30) years and at least five (5) years after the most 
recent request for the furnishing of a sample of the deposit was received by the 
depository.  In any case, samples must be stored under agreements that would make 
them available beyond the enforceable life of the patent for which the deposit was 
made. 
157 H.R. 5598, 101st Cong. § 203 (1990). 
158 Id. at § 204 (“Section 101 of title 35, United States Code, is amended by adding 
before the period at the end a comma and the following: ‘except that human beings are not 
patentable subject matter.’”). 
159 Id. at Title IV. 
160 H.R. REP. NO. 101-960, pt. 1, at 22, 1990 WL 201618; see also supra text 
accompanying notes 115-120. 
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patent-holders’ power,161 perceived that the PTO had already 
prevented patents on human beings,162 and believed that the PTO 
already had the power to use deposits to satisfy section 112(1).163
Commissioner Quigg overstated his agency’s power.  Seeing that 
the patent act requires the PTO to issue a patent whenever statutory 
requirements have been satisfied, Commissioner Quigg is simply 
wrong about the PTO’s ability to block patents on human beings.164  
He is similarly wrong about the PTO’s power to modify section 
112(1). 
The PTO’s rule-making authority is created by 35 U.S.C. § 2:165
The United States Patent and Trademark Office . . . 
(b)(2) may establish regulations, not inconsistent with law, which -- 
(A) shall govern the conduct of proceedings in the Office; 
(B) shall be made in accordance with section 553 of title 5; 
(C) shall facilitate and expedite the processing of patent 
applications, particularly those which can be filed, stored, 
processed, searched, and retrieved electronically, subject to the 
provisions of section 122 relating to the confidential status of 
applications; 
161 Hearing on H.R. 1556, Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, 
and the Administration of Justice, of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 
189-90 (Oct. 31, 1989) (Letter from Donald J. Quigg to Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier) 
Serial No. 76 (available as 1990 CIS fiche 521-57), reprinted in Transgenic Animal Patent 
Reform Act of 1989 [hereinafter “1989 Hearings”]. 
There is even the possibility that a statutory “research exemption” would not only 
fail to provide greater certainty [than case law] but could serve to enlarge the 
present narrow limitation on a patent owner’s rights.  The Administration would not 
favor legislation creating a “research exemption” . . . because it could diminish the 
strong incentive provided by the patent system. 
Id. 
162 Id. at 153 (statement of Donald J. Quigg, Commissioner, U.S. Patent & Trademark 
Office). 
163 Id. 
164 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . .”); 
see also Bagley, supra note 15, at 491 (agreeing that the PTO lacks power to prevent 
patents on human beings and citing recent statements by the PTO acknowledging this 
inability). 
165 Quigg refers to 35 U.S.C. § 6.  1989 Hearings, supra note 161, at 153 (statement of 
Donald J. Quigg, Commissioner, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office) (“This authority [to 
promulgate regulations] is already broadly conveyed by section 6 of title 35, United States 
Code.”).  35 U.S.C. § 6 (2004) currently deals only with the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences; it does not mention any power to promulgate regulations. 
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(D) may govern the recognition and conduct of agents, attorneys, or 
other persons representing applicants or other parties before the 
Office, and may require them, before being recognized as 
representatives of applicants or other persons, to show that they are 
of good moral character and reputation and are possessed of the 
necessary qualifications to render to applicants or other persons 
valuable service, advice, and assistance in the presentation or 
prosecution of their applications or other business before the Office; 
(E) shall recognize the public interest in continuing to safeguard 
broad access to the United States patent system through the reduced 
fee structure for small entities under section 41(h)(1) of this title; 
and 
(F) provide for the development of a performance-based process 
that includes quantitative and qualitative measures and standards for 
evaluating cost-effectiveness and is consistent with the principles of 
impartiality and competitiveness166
 
The PTO did follow Administrative Procedure Act procedures to 
promulgate rules regarding biological deposits for section 112(1) use.  
The addressed comments dealt with the details of the rules, not with 
the PTO’s power to dilute section 112(1).167
As I read 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2), the PTO lacks the authority, for two 
independent reasons, to use deposit in lieu of the written, enabling 
description required by section 112(1) (though the PTO is allowed to 
require deposits and models to supplement enabling written 
descriptions).168  First, the PTO may promulgate only regulations “not 
inconsistent with law.”169  Section 112(1) is law.170  Second, the PTO 
may promulgate regulations only in the listed categories.  These 
categories do not include the requirements for patentability, as 
opposed to “the conduct of proceedings in the Office.”171  
Commissioner Quigg lists several cases that allegedly allow the use of 
166 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) (2000). 
167 See 52 Fed. Reg. 34080 (Sept. 9, 1987) (advance notice of proposed rulemaking); 53 
Fed. Reg. 39420 (Oct. 6, 1988) (notice of proposed rulemaking); 54 Fed. Reg. 34864 
(Aug. 22, 1989) (final rule). 
168 See 35 U.S.C. § 114 (2000). 
169 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) (2000). 
170 Accord Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(recognizing that the PTO’s Guidelines and its Manual of Patent Examining Procedure that 
discuss patentability issues “are not binding on [the] court, but may be given judicial 
notice to the extent they do not conflict with the statute”) (emphasis added). 
171 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A). 
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deposits for section 112(1) purposes.172  They all rely on Argoudelis, 
which, as discussed above, does not address the core issue.  
Argoudelis furthermore, dealt with a deposit of material needed to 
practice a claimed process.  The res deposited was a starting point, 
not a claimed product.  Commissioner Quigg’s cases simply expand a 
decision that was never made. The PTO’s depository rule-making 
assumed a power the PTO did not have. 
The PTO has issued full utility patents on sexually reproduced 
plants.  The Court in J.E.M. sets the figure at 1800.173  How many of 
these do not meet the enabling written description requirement of 
section 112(1), absent improper reliance on deposit?  Seemingly quite 
a few utility patents on plants are at risk.  Perhaps most biotechnology 
patents are vulnerable. 
The legal test for enablement is that the written description must 
enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to practice the invention 
without undue experimentation.174  If one can only reproduce the 
transgenic organism by biological reproduction of the deposited 
material, the written description is not enabling on its own (something 
that the majority of the Supreme Court did not recognize in 
J.E.M.).175
172 See 1989 Hearings, supra note 161, at 190 (letter from Donald J. Quigg, 
Commissioner, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office) (relying on In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 
1390 (C.C.P.A. 1970); Feldman v. Aunstrup, 517 F.2d 1351 (C.C.P.A. 1975); In re 
Lundak, 773 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).  All of these cases deal with deposit of material 
necessary to practice the invention, but not of a product claimed in the patent.  The 
deposits were available to the public on the issuance of the patent.  See In re Argoudelis, 
434 F.2d at 1394 (allowing patent inter alia because depository is “under a contractual 
obligation” to “supply samples to anyone seeking them once the patent issues”); Feldman, 
517 F.2d at 1355 (allowing patent inter alia because “the restrictions on access to [the 
deposit] were removed and the culture was made ‘open to the public’”); In re Lundak, 773 
F.2d at 1222 (allowing patent inter alia because depository provides “assurance of 
availability of the material to the public after the grant of the patent”). 
173 See J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 145 (2001).  
This figure is from the Solicitor General who supplies no details on its generation.  See 
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at *6, J.E.M. AG 
Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., No. 99-1996, 2001 WL 689516 (“As of April 
2001, approximately 1800 utility patents included claims to plants, seeds, plant parts, or 
plant tissues.  Approximately 1300 of those utility patents had an explicit claim to a plant 
seed.”); see also id. at *15 n.8 (“More than 1600 utility patents claim transgenic plant 
technology including claims to plants, seeds, and plant tissues.”). 
174 See, e.g., Elan Pharms., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research, 346 F.3d 
1051, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (explaining that a reference is “enabling” when it “teach[es] 
one of ordinary skill in the art to make or carry out the claimed invention without undue 
experimentation”). 
175 See J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 134 (“[I]n 1930 Congress believed that plants were not 
patentable under § 101 . . . because in practice they could not meet the stringent  
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My own research supports the claim that seemingly quite a few 
utility patents on plants are vulnerable to section 112(1) challenge.  
To check the incidence of problematic patents, I ran a search in the 
PTO’s files for all patents in class 800/295.176  The search engine 
description requirement.  Yet th[is] premise[] w[as] disproved over time.”) (emphasis in 
original); id. at 135 (referring to PPA legislative history, “[w]hatever Congress may have 
believed about the state of patent law and the science of plant breeding in 1930, plants 
have always had the potential to fall within the general subject matter of § 101,. . . . ”) 
(emphasis in original); id. at 141 (referring to PVPA, “[t]he relevant statements in the 
legislative history reveal nothing more than the limited view of plant breeding taken by 
some Members of Congress who believed that patent protection was unavailable for 
sexually reproduced plants”). 
Elisa Rives has argued that sexually reproduced entities are inherently incapable of § 112 
enabling description because of the nature of sexual reproduction.  See Elisa Rives, 
Comment, Mother Nature and the Courts:  Are Sexually Reproducing Plants and Their 
Progeny Patentable Under the Utility Patent Act of 1952?, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 187, 222-26 
(2001-02) (arguing inherent indefiniteness of all sexually reproduced entities).  Rives 
relies in part on a case involving § 112, ¶ 2 (requiring claims which “particularly point[] 
out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his 
invention.”); see In re Merat, 519 F.2d 1390, 1391 (C.C.P.A. 1975)(affirming § 112, ¶ 2 
final rejection of claims for a “Method of Improving Strains of Chickens.”).  While I am 
grateful to Rives for this argument, Merat involved indefinite identification of the parent 
lines, not the indefiniteness of progeny’s characteristics.  See Merat, 519 F.2d at 1396 
(“[T]he claim language is not precise enough to indicate which kind of cock to use to 
produce the result required by the claims. . . .”).  If seed deposits are § 112, ¶ 1 “written 
descriptions,” deposit seems to identify progenitors clearly.  Accord Ex parte C, 27 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1492, 1495 (B.P.A.I. 1993) (reversing rejection of plant related claims 
for similar lack of specific written description of progenitors on ground of seed deposit). 
Rives also argues that the essence of sexual reproduction is the seemingly random 
combination of genes from each parent which are inherited by each separate offspring.  
According to Rives, seed deposits will not breed true for more than a single generation, 
specifying the two parent varieties to cross for a hybrid will not guarantee uniform genetic 
makeup of all progeny, and the problem would not be solved even if (counter factually at 
present) scientists could write down the entire gene map of the parents.  See Rives, supra.  
The PTO database includes patents on hybrid plants whose specifications identify the 
parent lines. For example, U.S. Utility Patent on “Hybrid Maize Plant and Seed 33J56,” 
(31 claims) held by Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. is summarized as involving “a 
hybrid maize plant, designated as 33J56, produced by crossing two Pioneer Hi-Bred 
International, Inc. proprietary inbred maize lines GE514431 and GE483237.”  Both parent 
lines and the claimed progeny line are supported by deposits.  See id.  Unfortunately, I 
believe that good drafting should allow a sufficiently clear explanation of how covered 
progeny can be separated from progeny which do not contain the characteristics covered 
by claims.  Therefore, I cannot support Rives’ intriguing arguments. 
176 According to the PTO, 800/295 is the classification used when the claimed 
invention is a “plant, seedling, plant seed, or plant part per se.”  USPTO Classification 
Definitions, available at www.uspto.gov/go/classification/ uspc800sched800. 
htm#C8005295000.
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presented 407.177  I then used the search result list to jump into the 
full text of each patent.  In each, I searched for the term “deposit.”  I 
located 180 utility patents which, to my scientifically untrained eyes, 
seemed to depend on a deposit of biological material to satisfy section 
112(1).178  A large number of these inserted a reference to a deposit in 
the claim language to serve as part of the definition of the claimed 
invention, as contrasted to referencing a deposit only in the written 
description for purposes of disclosure.179  While admitting my lack of 
177 See data base search results of March 3, 2004 (on file with author).  The raw search 
result was 409, but I eliminated two because they were in subclass 296 or 297 
(multicellular algae and mushroom).  See id. 
178 PTO regulations expressly state that use of a deposit in a patent specification does 
not create a presumption that the deposit is necessary to satisfy § 112, even though 
deposits are only required when necessary to fulfill § 112.  See 37 C.F.R. § 1.802(b) 
(2003) (“Biological material need not be deposited unless access to such material is 
necessary for the satisfaction of the statutory requirements for patentability under 35 
U.S.C. § 112.”); 37 C.F.R. § 1.802(c) (“The reference to a biological material in a 
specification disclosure or the actual deposit of such material by an applicant or patent 
owner does not create any presumption that such material is necessary to satisfy 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112 or that deposit in accordance with these regulations is or was required.”). 
179 Below are the claims for three such patents: 
Soybean Variety APA94-31572 
What is claimed is: 
1. A soybean seed designated APA94-31572, a sample of said seed deposited under 
ATCC Accession No. PTA-5155. 
2. A soybean plant, or a part thereof, produced by growing the seed of claim 1. 
3. The soybean plant part of claim 2 wherein said part is pollen. 
4. The soybean plant part of claim 2 wherein said part is an ovule. 
5. A tissue culture of protoplasts or regenerable cells from the plant of claim 2. 
6. The tissue culture according to claim 5, the cells or protoplasts of the tissue 
culture are obtained from plant tissues selected from the group consisting of leaf, 
pollen, cotyledon, hypocotyl, embryos, root, pod, flower, shoot and stalk. 
7. A soybean plant regenerated from the tissue culture of claim 5 having all the 
morphological and physiological characteristics of soybean variety APA95-15294. 
8. A method for producing a progeny soybean plant comprising crossing the plant 
of claim 2 with a second soybean plant, harvesting the resultant soybean seed, and 
growing a progeny soybean plant. 
U.S. Utility Patent No. 6,632,985 (issued Oct. 14, 2003). 
 
Pepper Variety 
What is claimed is: 
1. A hybrid pepper plant grown from seed deposited with the ATCC under 
Accession No. PTA-2275. 
2. Fruit harvested from the plant of claim 1. 
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scientific training, without access to the referenced deposits, such 
references in the written description appear not to be enabling, even to 
persons of high skill in the relevant art.  Sun Devil Lettuce, for 
example, was created through a six-year selective breeding process, 
which started in year one with “a hand pollinated cross of PAG 02-23, 
an individual plant selection from the commercial variety Raider, 
available from Genecorp seed, and Van Pire also available from 
Genecorp Seed.”180
More expert opinion than mine, the opinion of Dr. Ignatio Chapela, 
supports the claim that all or almost all biotechnology patents may be 
vulnerable to section 112(1) challenge.181  This assertion should not 
be over-read.  Not all utility patents on plants are “biotechnology” 
3. Hybrid seed which can be grown to yield a pepper plant of claim 1. 
U.S. Utility Patent No. 6,498,287 (issued Dec. 24, 2002). 
 
Sun Devil Lettuce Variety 
We claim: 
1. Lettuce seed having ATCC Accession Number PTA-4008. 
2. A lettuce plant produced by growing the seed of claim 1. 
3. A lettuce plant having all the physiological and morphological characteristics of 
the lettuce plant of claim. 
4. A method of making an F.sub.1 hybrid lettuce plant consisting of crossing Sun 
Devil [the seed in claim one] as a first lettuce parent plant with a second lettuce 
parent plant, wherein Sun Devil is grown from the seed of claim 1; harvesting the 
resultant F.sub.1 hybrid seed; and growing an F.sub.1 hybrid seed into an F.sub.1 
hybrid lettuce plant. 
5. Pollen of the plant of claim 2. 
6. An ovule of the plant of claim 2. 
7. Tissue culture of the plant of claim 2. 
U.S. Utility Patent No. 6,495,744 (issued Dec. 17, 2002). 
180 Patent 6,495,744, supra note 179, at 8:  Detailed Description of the Invention (last 
paragraph). 
181 Dr. Chapela was an Assistant Professor in the Division of Ecosystem Sciences at the 
University of California, Berkeley until he was denied tenure in December of 2003.  
Critics have linked the denial to Dr. Chapela’s public criticism both of biotechnology and 
of Berkeley’s multi-million dollar ties with a biotechnology company.  See Sharon Walsh, 
Ignacio Chapela:  Berkeley Denies Tenure to Ecologist Who Criticized University’s Ties 
to the Biotechnology Industry, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (Jan. 9, 2004), 
available at http://www.utwatch. org/oldnews/chroniclehighered_tenure_biotech_1_9_04. 
html (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).  See also Ingnacio Chapela, UC Berkeley ESPM Faculty, 
available at http://espm.berkeley.edu/directory/fac/chapela_i.html (last visited Sept. 22, 
2004); Background Articles on and by Ignacio Chapela, at http://www.mindfully.org 
/GE/2003/Ignacio-Chapela30jun03.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2004). 
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patents in this sense.  Many plant utility patents involve controlled 
crosses of existing parent lines; the parent lines may or may not 
themselves have been created by direct gene manipulation.182  Dr. 
Chapela explains that genetically modified plants are created by 
repeated attempts to insert foreign genes into a subject.  Most such 
attempts fail.  Transgenic plant lines are created by biologically 
multiplying the occasional successes.  Such creations cannot be 
reliably duplicated by repeating the insertion process.  Neither the 
process nor the exact genetic modification obtained can be reduced to 
a written explication.183  Dr. Chapela’s knowledgeable representation 
severely undercuts the legal sufficiency of written descriptions of 
biotechnology patents. 
182 The primary plant involved in U.S. Utility Patent No. 6,498,287 is created by non-
transgenic breeding techniques.  See No. 6,498,287, supra note 179, at Specification:  
Description of the Specific Embodiment (“The hybrid plants of the invention result from a 
cross of parental lines. . . .”).  In contrast, U.S. Utility Patent No. 6,646,184 
(“Trichothecene-resistant transgenic plants”; assignee Syngenta Participations AG) 
involves four claims dealing with a transgene and plants which have been modified by 
insertion of material containing the transgene. 
What is claimed is: 
1. A plasmid designated pNOV1700 deposited as NRRL Accession No. B-30117. 
2. An isolated nucleic acid molecule having the sequence of the 4117bp PvuII 
fragment in plasmid pNOV1700 (B-30117). 
3. A plant cell comprising a nucleic acid molecule according to claim 2. 
4. A plant comprising plant cell according to claim 3. 
5. A plant according to claim 4, which is wheat or corn. 
U.S. Utility Patent No. 6,646,184 (issued Nov. 11, 2003). 
183 This statement is based on Dr. Chapela’s comments at the Malthus, Mendel and 
Monsanto Conference.  Dr. Chapela has kindly approved it for publication.  For those 
wishing a more technical explanation, Dr. Chapela asserts the following: 
1. A specific insertion of DNA into a specific position within a specific genome is 
not achievable without strenuous trial and error. In other words, the insertion 
cannot be predictably and reliably described.  Even careful methods, which are not 
used in commercial products because of their level of involvement, such as site-
directed mutagenesis and site-specific trangenesis (e.g., Cre/lox-mediated site-
specific gene integration) fit into this general observation. 
2. Furthermore, the specific expression of any insertion of a transgenic DNA 
sequence cannot be predicted or reliably pre-ordained without strenuous trial and 
error. The actual mechanism through which such expression is achieved cannot be 
described in detail. 
Under these circumstances there cannot exist a written description that can direct an 
expert in the art to reliably and reproducibly create a specific transgenic organism. 
E-mail from Ignacia Chapela to Malla Pollack, Visiting Professor, Univ. of Ore. School of 
Law (Apr. 29, 2004 10:14 PST) (on file with author). 
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In short, the PTO (with Federal Circuit acquiescence) has modified 
the written description requirement to permit the grant of otherwise 
illegitimate utility patents on plants.  This modification lacks statutory 
authority. The J.E.M. opinion implies that the Court would have 
decided differently if it had known of this PTO modification.  
Opponents of full utility patents on plants should aggressively litigate 
section 112(1) issues.184
CONCLUSION 
Congress never decided to allow private entities the power to block 
experimentation on food crops; Congress never decided to allow full 
utility patents on sexually reproduced plants.  The courts and the PTO 
have illegitimately bypassed representative government to create and 
enforce such private power.  The PTO has made this private power 
even more onerous by allowing such patents to issue even when the 
applications do not fulfill the statutory requirement of a full, enabling, 
written description.  The substituted deposit, furthermore, is much 
less publicly accessible than a written description.  Both the courts 
and the PTO, however, have hidden behind mythical decisions by 
Congress. 
What can we do?  We can raise the section 112(1) deposit issue in 
court suits.  We can pressure Congress to pass legislation disavowing 
its mythical former decisions.  Congress might take the sensible 
course of allowing deposit to substitute for an enabling written 
description only on res where the United States has a treaty obligation 
to allow full utility patent protection (i.e., yes for microorganisms, no 
for other plants and animals).185   Hopefully, the Malthus, Mendel, 
and Monsanto Conference will help raise support for such actions. 
 
184 Of course, the courts might again defer to PTO practice and patent holders’ specific 
investment backed expectations.  See J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 
Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 144-45 (2001) (referring to the PTO issuance of some 1,800 utility 
patents on plants). 
185 See TRIPS, supra note 88, art. 27, § 3(b). 
